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I. INTRODUCTION

As Justice Brandeis so eloquently argued more than a century ago in his
classic privacy article, the progress of science, especially in the area of
communication technology, made it imperative that we shift our attention
from the letter to the spirit of law to protect the individual against the
privacy invasions of modem inventions.1 The technological landscape
continues to change at a much faster pace than constitutional law, which
has yet to deal with such new contrivances of science as computer
communications across telephone lines and electronic surveillance of the
public by sophisticated devices that detect, monitor, and record personal
information. The purpose of this Article is to explore and determine the
constitutionality of electronic mail searching and scanning by government
in light of recent Fourth Amendment rulings and trends.
Toward this end, I will begin by presenting some of the new modes of
communication, and proceed to assess the constitutionality of the
warrantless search and seizure of electronic mail. Since this issue has not
been addressed by the U.S. Supreme Court yet, I will attempt to develop
* Ph.D., Darton College (2003).
1. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy,4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 196
(1890).
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what is arguably a proper basis for constitutional analysis regarding this
emerging area of Fourth Amendment search law by relying on federal and
military court decisions as well as the valuable insights of respected
commentators. I will also point out the situations in which Fifth
Amendment issues could potentially arise. In conclusion, I will answer
some hypothetical questions and propose some guidelines for determining
when government action is unjustifiably intrusive, because what is
constitutionally permissible may not necessarily be a good public policy.
H. MODES OF MODERN COMMUNICATION

A. Land Line Telephones
Although land line telephones, which date back to the last quarter of the
nineteenth century, can hardly be described as modem anymore, they are
probably the best departure point in our inquiry for two reasons. First,
many of the subsequent instruments of telecommunication networks, such
as teleprinter exchange (telex), facsimile transmissions (faxes), and
electronic mail (e-mail), are essentially based on the telephone and make
use of the same underground cables, digital lines, radios, and satellite links
to make connections between two or more users. Second, telephones have
been in use by the police and the public long enough to allow the
development of a sizable body of legal code and case law around them.
The constitutional analysis of these cases may be extended to the newer
and more advanced forms of communication technology.
In the seminal case of Katz v. United States,2 the Court found that the
warrantless wiretapping of standard land line telephones constituted an
unreasonable search. This means that land line telephone calls are
constitutionally protected against warrantless seizure and subsequent use
in a criminal trial by government, because a person placing a call "may rely
upon the protection of the Fourth Amendment," whether he happens to be
in a business office, a friend's apartment, a taxicab, or a telephone booth.3
Before Katz, postal mail was the only commonly used communication
medium protected from unauthorized interception.4 Most professionals
were then forced to meet with their clients in person or exchange
information with them via mail in order to protect their confidences and,

2. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
3. Id. at 352.
4. Exparte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877).
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in the case of legal practitioners, to preserve the attorney-client privilege.5
Katz was thus the decision that paved the road for communication privacy
in the information age by significantly altering the interpretation of the
Fourth Amendment and attaching a reasonable expectation of privacy to
high tech wire communications. 6
B. Cordless and CellularTelephones
Based on the ruling of Katz,7 as tersely put by Justice Harlan, a
reasonable expectation of privacy in a communication medium is a
condition precedent to investing it with Fourth Amendment protection.
Federal courts have overwhelmingly held that cordless telephone
communications lack such expectation.8 Because mobile phones utilize
radio waves, which are broadcast in all directions and are more susceptible
to interception by a third party than traditional phones, the majority of
courts have reasoned that cordless communications do not offer the
requisite reasonable expectation of privacy necessary to extend
constitutional protection. In fact, a Senate Report also deemed it
inappropriate to make interceptions of cordless telephone communications
a criminal offense because they could be easily intercepted with readily
available technologies, such as an AM radio. 9
Most federal courts have remained steadfast in that position despite the
progressive growth in telecommunications technology. To mention but a
few illustrative examples, in Tyler v. Berodt,' the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit confirmed the convictions of the defendants, rejecting their
assertions of privacy expectation in the conversations they made on a
cordless phone. Again, in United States v. Smith, while conceding that
nearly half of all American households use cordless telephones, the Fifth
Circuit held that "pure radio communications" are not afforded the same
Fourth Amendment protection as communications carried by land-based
telephone lines because "broadcasting communications into the air by radio
waves is more analogous to carrying on an oral communication in a loud
5. William P. Matthews, Encoded Confidences: Electronic Mail, the Internet, and the
Attorney-Client Privilege, 45 U. KAN. L. REv. 273, 295 (1996).
6. Katz, 389 U.S. at 360-61.
7. Id.
8. See Tyler v. Berodt, 877 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022 (1990);
United States v. Smith, 978 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 999 (1993); id. at 177
(quoting United States v. Hall, 488 F.2d 193, 196 (9th Cir. 1973)); In re Askin, 47 F.3d 100 (4th
Cir. 1995); McKamey v. Roach, 55 F.3d 1236, 1240 (6th Cir. 1995).
9. Robert A. Pikowsky, Privilege and Confidentiality of Attorney-Client Communication
via Email, 51 BAYLOR L. REv. 483, 522 (1999).
10. Tyler, 877 F.2d at 705.
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voice or with a megaphone than it is to the privacy afforded by a wire.""
Finally, in 1995, the Fourth Circuit upheld convictions derived from
intercepted conversations because the AM or FM radio signals of cordless
phones "can be intercepted with relative ease. .".'"'The Sixth Circuit
noted in the same year that "no reported decision has concluded that a
cordless telephone user has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his
cordless phone conversations under Title III or the Fourth Amendment."' 3
Critics of the above position would contend that the possibility of
inadvertent interception is separate from personal expectation, because
most people using a mobile phone expect their conversation to be private.
Lawrence Tribe of Harvard University School of Law supports this view,
contending that a cautious professional criminal knows the vulnerabilities
and security risks associated with mobile phones that endanger his
reasonable expectation of privacy, while the average citizen does not and
expects his radio wave communications to be confidential.' 4 But this was
precisely the argument that the defendant unsuccessfully presented in
Smith. He argued "the interception of his cordless phone conversations was
a search because he did not know how the cordless phone worked or that
his conversations would not be private."' 5 Hardly persuaded by this line of
reasoning, the Court simply stated "a subjective expectation of privacy
does not, by itself, give rise to Fourth Amendment protection."' 6
As for the legal status of cellular telephones, it is not entirely clear
because no federal court has explicitly held that Fourth Amendment
protection is unavailable for cellular telephone conversations. On the one
hand, one could argue that they are not protected by the Fourth
Amendment because they fall in the category of oral communications
rather than wire communications. The technical distinction between oral
and wire communications was made three decades ago in UnitedStates v.
Hall,7 in which the court of appeals found that oral communications
broadcasted into the air by radio waves, as opposed to wire
communications involving two regular land line telephones, failed to meet
the Fourth Amendment test under Katz, because the former can be readily
intercepted. But the Hall court also found that if one party to a
communication used a land line telephone, then the conversation would be
11. Smith, 978 F.2d at 177 (quoting Hall, 488 F.2d at 196).
12. Askin, 47 F.3d at 100.
13. McKamey v. Roach, 55 F.3d 1236, 1240 (6th Cir. 1995). Title III of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 is commonly known as the Federal Wiretap Act.
14. DANIEL E. HALL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND THE CONSTITUTION 156 (1997).
15. Smith, 978 F.2d at 177.
16. Id.
17. Hall, 488 F.2d at 193.
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considered a wire communication for constitutional purposes, even if the
other party was using a radiotelephone."
On the other hand, there is reason to believe, in light of more recent
case law, that oral cellular communications could be protected by the
Fourth Amendment. In Shubert v. Metrophone, Inc., 9 for instance, several
plaintiffs sued their cellular telephone carriers for not using the available
scrambling or encrypting techniques, thereby making their calls easily
susceptible to interception. The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the
complaint because it was founded on "the mere facilitation of cellular
transmissions," rather than the improper acquisition of the contents of the
plaintiffs' communications by intentional interception. 20 Although the
claim was lodged on statutory rather than constitutional grounds, the gist
of the opinion is that cellular telephone users are entitled to expect privacy.
Moreover, in United States v. Mathis,21 the Eleventh Circuit (indirectly)
recognized the existence of a privacy interest in cellular phone
conversations based on federal law. At issue was the introduction of
private conversations made by the defendant on cordless and cellular
telephones that were intercepted by police with neither his consent nor
prior judicial approval, which the lower court had admitted as lawful
evidence in 1992. On appeal, the circuit court "agree[d] with the district
court to the extent that, at the time [the defendant's] conversations were
intercepted, federal statutory law recognized no reasonable expectation of
privacy on a cordless telephone. 22 In other words, the circuit court implied
that a warrant was not necessary at that time to intercept such
communications but might be necessary now under new congressional
amendments that were subsequently adopted. In so holding, the circuit
court tacitly recognized that oral communications conducted over cellular
telephones warrant legal protection.
In another 1996 case, United States v. Gaytan, the government's
evidence "consisted of tape recordings and transcripts of the defendants'
cellular telephone conversations obtained through a wiretap,, 23 as required
by federal law.24 Why would government agents have to apply for a

18. Id.at 197.
19. Shubert v. Metrophone, Inc., 898 F.2d 401 (3rd Cir. 1990).
20. Id.at 403.
21. United States v. Mathis, 96 F.3d 1577 (11th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1213
(1997).
22. Id.at 1583 (emphasis added).
23. United States v. Gaytan, 74 F.3d 545, 553 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1006
(1996).
24. 18 U.S.C. § 25 18(1 1)(b)(iv) reads "The order authorizing or approving the interception
is limited to interception only for such time as it is reasonable to presume that the person identified
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warrant before wiretapping private cellular telephone conversations unless
the user had justifiably and reasonably expected that his communications
would not be subject to interception? This conclusion is further
substantiated by the fact that most cellular phones, unlike their cordless
counterparts, now scramble their signals and operate at a frequency range
with a minimum risk of interference or interception, unless a specially
adapted scanner is used. 25
C. Fax Communications
Communications carried by faxes are similar in vein to other forms of
protected wire communications in that they consist of digital signals
transmitted over a traditional wired network. Facsimile transmissions,
however, whether sent from computer to computer or fax machine to fax
machine, do run the risks of inadvertent misdialing and misdirection due
to human error. In spite of the absence of absolute security, a properly
directed and received fax has the convenience of almost instant
correspondence, as well as the advantage over a telephone conversation of
providing the parties involved with a tangible paper record of every
transaction and instance of communication.
The case law on fax communications is extremely meager on both state
and federal court levels. At least one state court has found that faxes
exchanged between attorneys and clients are confidential and privileged,26
which indicates that a reasonable expectation of privacy exists in faxed
documents. Although no federal court to date has so held, it can be fairly
assumed that such finding is in order given that many courts have begun
accepting faxed legal documents and utilizing the fax machine to
correspond with attorneys.27 Some commentators have also argued for the
legitimacy of the privacy interest in fax communications because they are
not easily intercepted and are relied upon perhaps more heavily than
telephones in today's business world. Jarvis and Tellam, for instance, are
of the opinion that "unquestionably a fax that is not misdirected can be the
subject of a claim of privilege," and hence subject to constitutional

in the application is or was reasonably proximate to the instrument through which such
communication will be or was transmitted" (emphasis added). 18 U.S.C. § 2518(lI)(v)(iv) (1998).
The elastic term "instrument" provides for the possibility of broader interpretation.
25. Sean M. O'Brien, Extending the Attorney-Client Privilege: Do Internet Email
Communications Warrant a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy?, 4 SuFFoLK J.TRIAL & APP.
ADvoc. 187, 199 (1999).
26. West Virginia ex rel. U.S. Fidelity & Trust Co. v. Canady, 460 S.E.2d 677 (W. Va. 1995).
27. Mitchel L. Winick et al., Playing I Spy with Client Confidences: Confidentiality,
Privilege and Electronic Communications, 31 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1225, 1240 (2000).
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protection because "the expectation of confidentiality in attorney-client
relationships and the expectation of privacy in the context of Fourth
Amendment for search and seizure purposes are largely parallel
concepts. 28
D. Telex Transmissions
Turning to telex messages, the telecommunication predecessor of email, we immediately realize that federal courts have a mixed and
inconsistent record in treating them as reliable evidence, although they are
transmitted over land-based telephone lines. In the case of UnitedStates v.
Kim,29 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia refused to admit
into evidence a telex message offered by the defense because, among other
reasons, its "method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of
trustworthiness" because of its inconsistency with other supporting
evidence.30 Since the Kim court focused more on the context of the
pertinent transactions and less on the fact that the evidence consisted in
telexes, it is not clear whether the Kim court excluded the evidence because
of circumstances unique to the case or the status of telexes as records. The
First Circuit also refused to admit telexes into evidence on "questionable
trustworthiness" grounds,3 as did the Second Circuit, which noted "telexes
of this sort are not business records and contain many inaccuracies. 3 2 But
again, it is not entirely clear whether their findings were based on the
features of the cases or ambivalence toward the nature of telexes, and this
issue has not reappeared before the courts.
At any rate, other federal courts have admitted telex messages into
evidence.33 Of particular interest to us is UnitedStates v. Gregg,34 in which
the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit admitted court-authorized
interceptions of telex communications introduced by the government and
affirmed the lower court's decision. When the defendants argued in the
district court that the telex interceptions did not meet the requirements of
28. Peter R. Jarvis & Bradley F. Tellam, Competence and Confidentiality in the Context of
Cellular Telephone, Cordless Telephone, and Email Communications,33 WILLAMETTE L. REV.
467, 472, 478 (1997).
29. United States v. Kim, 595 F.2d 755 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
30. Id. at 760-61.
31. Willco Kuwait (Trading) S.A.K. v. deSavary, 843 F.2d 618, 628 (1st Cir. 1988).
32. United States v. Nixon, 779 F.2d 126, 134 (2d Cir. 1985).
33. Particularly the Third and Eighth Circuits. See United States v. Reilly, 33 F.3d 1396 (3d
Cir. 1994); United States v. Gregg, 829 F.2d 1430 (8th Cir. 1987). In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court
itself has admitted telex messages detailing financial transactions as primary evidence in Citibank
N.A. v. Wells Fargo.495 U.S. 660 (1990).
34. Gregg, 829 F.2d at 1430.
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the Fourth Amendment, the district court did not sweep aside their
contention as irrelevant, but went on to examine whether probable cause
existed for the telex warrants, whether the warrants were based on the
supporting affidavits, and whether they met the particularity
requirements. 5 In finding that the warrants complied in all respects with
Fourth Amendment requirements, both courts in effect confirmed that a
legitimate expectation of privacy exists in telex communications.
E. E-Mail Messaging
We finally get to electronic mail, one of the latest developments in
popular communication technology. A revolution in telecommunications,
e-mail allows computer users to efficiently send messages and data files
across the country (or even the globe) almost instantly, and to keep an
accurate and permanent record of this exchange for later reference on both
the sender's and recipient's computers. Sending information by e-mail has
the additional advantages over telephone and traditional mail of never
getting a busy signal and free, speedy delivery. It is also more practical
than faxes because it does not require that a recipient be present at the
receiving end to pick it up and it can be sent at once to more than one
destination and retrieved from more than one location.36
The convenience, speed, cost-effectiveness, and wide accessibility of
e-mail have made it a tremendous success, as evident from the volume of
e-mails transmitted by businesses in the United States, which is estimated
at 3.5 billion per day. 3" The use of e-mail and the Internet has become an
indispensable part of the modem business world, holding an estimated
sixty percent of the average company's most vital business data. 3 A survey
conducted in the early 1990s revealed that e-mail was being used in some
capacity by seventy-five percent of all large companies in the United
States. 39 A more recent study found that, based on past trends and growth

35. United States v. Gregg, 629 F. Supp. 958, 959-61 (W.D. Mo. 1986).
36. Alissa R. Spielberg, Online Without a Net: Physician-PatientCommunication by
Electronic Mail, 25 AM. J.L. & MED. 267, 270 (1999).
37. Chris Gray, EndEmail Chaos: An Introductionto EmailData Management, Computer
Technology Review (May 2001), available at http://www.wwpi.com/Archive/show_article.asp?
ArticlelD=460 (last visited Nov. 6,2003). E-mails sent via government-provided accounts and free
and paid on-line networks are not included in this enormous figure, which is quoted only to
demonstrate the prevalence of and dependence on e-mail in today's work environment.
38. Id.
39. Larry 0. Natt Gantt, II, An Affront to Human Dignity: Electronic Mail Monitoringin the
PrivateSector Workplace, 8 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 345, 348 (1995).
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prospects, the number of employees corresponding via e-mail is expected
to increase by twenty percent every year.40
Like postal mail, every e-mail message is directed to a unique,
personally identifiable address and delivered to a password-protected
electronic mailbox, where unread messages await the user to access the
mailbox and open them. The Internet, which is the existing version of the
Information Superhighway, serves as the primary medium in which the
global e-mail network operates.4 ' It consists of a worldwide network of
computers that communicate with each other using hard telephone lines or
satellites. Before it reaches the recipient's mailbox, a sent Internet e-mail
message travels through several intermediate computers and leased lines,
known as hosts and routers, which are often owned and operated by third
parties.42 A copy is made of every transmitted e-mail message as it passes
through these intermediary hosts or routers, which may be lawfully used
or disclosed by router employees to the extent necessary to protect its
rights or render the service. 43 This so-called store-and-forward technology

40. Kevin P. Kopp, ElectronicCommunicationsin the Workplace: Email Monitoringandthe
Right ofPrivacy, 8 SETON HALL CONST. J. 861, 862 (1998).
41. Some e-mail systems, such as corporate internal e-mail systems whose access is restricted
to employees, utilize the so-called "local area network" (LAN) for interoffice communication;
which, unlike Internet e-mail, is a private network environment in which e-mail messaging occurs
entirely over direct computer communication without utilizing external land-based telephone lines.
These distinctions are significant from a Fourth Amendment point of view, at least under the U.S.
Supreme Court's current interpretation ofKatz that requires individuals to guard their informational
privacy and minimize the assumption of risk. Courts have been employing the assumption of risk
rationale based on the Supreme Court's rulings in United States v. Miller,425 U.S. 435 (1976) and
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) to limit the scope of Fourth Amendment protection. See
Gavin Skok, Establishing a Legitimate Expectation of Privacy in Clickstream Data, 6 MICH.
TELECOMM. TECH. L. REv. 61, 72-74 (1999/2000).
42. O'Brien, supra note 24, at 206-07.
43. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(i) reads:
It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for an operator of a switchboard, or an officer,
employee, or agent of a provider of wire or electronic communication service, whose
facilities are used in the transmission of a wire or electronic communication, to intercept,
disclose, or use that communication in the normal course of his employment while engaged
in any activity which is a necessary incident to the rendition of his service or to the
protection of the rights or property of the provider of that service....
18 U.S.C. § 251 l(2)(a)(1) (2003). However narrow these exceptions may be, users who transmit
confidential information or sensitive data would want to avoid all kinds of disclosure if possible.
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is necessary to ensure message arrival, since electronic mail must travel
through several computers before it reaches its intended recipient, but it
raises serious privacy concerns on the part of users."
The development of e-mail constitutes yet another challenge to
government because e-mail communications may be used for illicit or
illegitimate purposes. Detection and prevention of these activities entails
invading the privacy of users by accessing and sometimes monitoring their
e-mails. At the societal level, government may have to gain access to
private e-mail for investigative purposes to gather after-the-fact evidence
of criminal behavior. In other instances, it may have to intercept e-mail
traffic in real time to prevent the consummation of an illegal scheme. 45 But
the public value of privacy in communication would be unreasonably
compromised if government were allowed to conduct indiscriminate
searches of private e-mails.
At the organizational level, Reg Whitaker, a noted authority on
information technology, argues that all employers have a valid interest in
verifying that their e-mail systems are not being used for unethical
46
purposes and that their employees are not engaged in criminal activity.
He refers to the Iran-Contra affair as a good example of how public interest
could be served by accessing the e-mail correspondence of government
employees, because Oliver North, among other conspirators, was identified
by checking archived e-mails.47 On the other hand, Amitai Etzioni, a
communitarian sociologist, argues that the lack of e-mail privacy adversely
affects organizational culture and undermines the sense of community in
the work place. 4' The concessions that need to be made for law
enforcement purposes in order to balance the conflicting interests at stake
will be discussed later in this Article.

44. Colleen L. Rest, Electronic Mail andConfidential Client-Attorney Communications: Risk
Management, 48 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 309, 315 (1998).
45. The U.S. government has a global intelligence network known as "Echelon," which is
composed of a set of bases and satellites that have the capability of intercepting telephone calls,
faxes, and e-mails. An outgrowth of Anglo-American Cold War military technology, Echelon is a
powerful spying system that works by intercepting wireless communications traffic and electronic
signals transmitted from any country in the world via satellites, which are predominantly owned by
the United States and a handful of western nations. See Jim Wilson, Spying on Us, POPULAR
MECHANICS, Apr. 2001, at 69-71; Declan McCullagh, Report Downplays Echelon Effect, WIRED
NEWS, May 24,2001, available at http://www.wired.com/news/privacy/0, 1848,44072,00.htmi (last
visited Nov. 17, 2003).
46. REG WM1TAKER, THE END OF PRIVACY: How TOTAL SURVEILLANCE IS BECOMING A

REALITY 105 (The New Press 1999).
47. Id.
48. Id.
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RELEVANT CASE LAW

The American Management Association reports that forty percent of
major American corporations monitor their employees electronically in the
normal scope of business, using a variety of methods that range from
counting their computer keystrokes to reading their electronic mail, and
from listening to their telephone conversations to observing them by
overhead closed-circuit television cameras.49 While millions of Americans
work under the watchful and electronic eye of their bosses, they cannot
invoke the Fourth Amendment whose strictures are directed against the
officers of the state to the exclusion of private citizens. Unlike public
organizations, privately owned businesses are only bound by statutory law
and congressional legislation, such as Title III of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, the Privacy Act of 1974, and the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 that Congress passed as
an amendment to Title III, with the intention of extending its coverage to
new types of digital communications technologies including e-mail,
although it remains largely untested in that area.5° Admittedly, monitoring
technologies have intensified employee privacy concerns in the public and
private sector alike, but given the nature of this study, the latter is not part
of our inquiry which focuses on Fourth and Fifth Amendment laws that
apply only in governmental work settings.
Justice Clark once lamented "the law, though jealous of individual
privacy, has not kept pace with these advances in scientific knowledge."'"
Because the U.S. Supreme Court has not yet undertaken to reconsider the
balance between the government's interests and the individual's right to
privacy, or to redefine the contours of Fourth Amendment protection in
light of this new technology, the legal boundaries of e-mail technology
remain somewhat hazy. To draw our conclusions, then, we will have to
rely on the opinions of lower courts, and the possible legal and technical
parallels between e-mail and the other forms of communication discussed
above.
E-mail presents the judiciary and lawmakers with a difficult case
because it falls somewhere between a telephone communication and a

49. Brad Marlowe, You Are Being Watched: Think You Can Outsmart Big Brother? Think
Again, PC/COMPUTING, Dec. 1999, at 84.
50. William P. Matthews, Encoded Confidences: Electronic Mail, the Internet, and the
Attorney-Client Privilege, 45 KAN. L. REV. 299 (1996).
51. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41,49 (1967).
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written correspondence via postal mail.52 It resembles a telephone call
because it consists of intangible electronic signals traveling through wire
systems, and a first class letter in that the data in the transmission contains
a nonvocal textual message. But while e-mail is a cross between both, it is
afforded the privacy protection of neither against government interception
and acquisition.
Based on Katz, police must obtain a search warrant from a judge in
order to wiretap a telephone line or listen to a private conversation,
whether made from the home or a public telephone booth. Further, the
government must establish to the judge authorizing the wiretap that normal
procedures have been tried but failed to serve its investigative interest and
that the communications to be intercepted are linked to the commission of
an offense. As for searches of first class mail, they too can only be done
pursuant to a court order but are even more narrowly drawn than telephone
wiretaps.53 While probable cause to engage in electronic eavesdropping is
particularized to a telephone user and subjects all his calls to government
surveillance, probable cause to open first class mail is not particularized to
a sender but to pieces of mail directed to specific recipients and hence less
general.54 Thus, both modes of communication have full Fourth
Amendment protection from unreasonable searches and seizures, whereas
e-mails, as will be seen from the cases below, have not been afforded the
same level of protection.
With the ubiquity of e-mail in the work place, e-mail evidence has
lately come to play a key role in litigation in general and employment
lawsuits in particular. More courts are now admitting e-mails as relevant
and competent evidence. For instance, in Aviles v. McKenzie,55 a wrongful
termination and employment discrimination case, the Second Circuit
accepted the e-mail presented by the plaintiff to buttress his claims as
viable evidence. Again, in Strauss v. Microsoft Corp.,56 e-mails received
by the plaintiff from her supervisor were used as the principal piece of

52. Laurie Thomas Lee, Watch Your Email! Employee Email Monitoringand Privacy Law
in the Age of the "ElectronicSweatshop," 28 J.MARSHALL L. REV. 170 (1994).
53. In Ex Parte Jackson, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that "letters and sealed
packages.., in the mail are fully guarded from examination and inspection. Ex Parte Jackson, 96
U.S. 727, 733 (1877); see also Hoover v. McChesney, 81 F. 472, 482 (Cir. Ct. D. Ky. 1897)
(showing the circuit court held that a statute permitting government officials to seize private letters
was unconstitutional. Relying on Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, the circuit court stated that
properly addressed letters "should be and are constitutionally equally exempt from seizure.").
54. Megan Connor Bertron, Home is Where Your Modem Is: An AppropriateApplication of
Search and Seizure Law to ElectronicMail, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 166, 171 (1996).
55. Aviles v. McKenzie, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3656 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
56. Strauss v. Microsoft Corp., 856 F. Supp. 821 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
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evidence at trial. In fact, the district court noted that these e-mails were
sufficiently persuasive as to "lead a reasonable jury to conclude
failed to promote Strauss as a result of gender
that . .. [Microsoft]
57
discrimination.
We now turn to e-mail cases involving the application of the Fourth
Amendment. The first major decision in the area of e-mail search law was
United States v. Maxwell,5" a case of criminal misconduct through
transmissions and communications using e-mail accounts provided by a
private on-line service. James A. Maxwell, an America On-Line (AOL)
subscriber, had the exclusive use of four separate screen names or
identities.59 The FBI received a tip that Maxwell was using his AOL e-mail
account to transmit and receive, in violation of federal law, visual images
of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct. Following discussions with
the informant and AOL officials, the FBI applied for and obtained a search
warrant permitting the seizure of information pertaining to suspected
subscribers in nine AOL computers. The search yielded visual
transmissions of child pornography bearing, among other AOL user names
for which they had a warrant, one of Maxwell's screen names. Included
within the files that the FBI seized were private e-mail communications
made by the defendant under a different screen name to another Air Force
member, in which he lucidly discussed his sexual preferences and desires.
These communications were used as the basis for an additional charge of
communicating indecent language.
The Air Force Criminal Court of Appeals found that the search and
seizure of the defendant's e-mail communications were controlled by the
unreasonableness clause of the Fourth Amendment because he "definitely
maintained an objective expectation of privacy in any email transmissions
6°
he made so long as they were stored in the America On-Line computers.
Maxwell "clearly" had an objective expectation of privacy in the stored
messages because "he alone could retrieve [them] through the use of his
own assigned password.' ' 6' Likewise, the defendant also had an objective
expectation of privacy in the e-mails transmitted to other AOL subscribers
because they all had individually assigned passwords. The Maxwell court

57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at 825.
United States v. Maxwell, 42 M.J. 568 (A.F.C.C.A. 1995).
Id.at 574.
Id. at 575.

61.

Id.at 576.
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also noted that computer e-mails, unlike cordless phone transmissions or
telephone calls, could not be "received by anyone other than the intended
recipients."62
Turning to the second question of probable cause, the court of appeals
determined that probable cause was required to seize information under
each separate e-mail account. The government established probable cause
in so far as identifying the defendant as the user of one screen name, and
hence, to seize the e-mail transmissions made only under that name, but
not the other three screen names that were readily furnished to the FBI by
AOL. Bureau agents investigating the matter were unaware of the
existence, much less the criminal behavior, of the other identities; it was
AOL personnel who made the connections between the multiple identities
for the FBI. This is the reason why none of the other three names appeared
on the search warrant.63 Moreover, the court of appeals likened the search
of electronic mailboxes to mailboxes at the post office, where one person
may rent several boxes for different purposes. That probable cause exists
to search one particular box does not mean that the government is
authorized to search all the other boxes possessed by the same person.
Accordingly, the court of appeals concluded that the seizure of e-mails for
those screen names that were initially unknown to the FBI and unstated on
the warrant was constitutionally impermissible, because there was no
probable cause to believe that a search of the files stored under those
names would reveal evidence of a crime. 64
In June 1996, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces granted
review to the Maxwell case. 65 The reviewing court approved most of the
findings of the appellate court below, but added several points that are very
instructive. In answering the constitutional questions before it, the
reviewing court examined a number of issues that could be applicable to
other e-mail search cases, of which we consider the ones most relevant to
our inquiry. First, the technology used to communicate via e-mail. In this
respect, the reviewing court found that technology is "extraordinarily
analogous to a telephone conversation," and hence "protected by the
66
Fourth Amendment if there is a reasonable expectation of privacy.
Second, with regard to the relationship between the defendant and AOL in
terms of contractual obligations, the court of appeals found that AOL's
agreement with Maxwell ensured his privacy. Finally, the court of appeals

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id.
Maxwell, 42 M.J. at 577.
Id.at 578.
United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406 (C.A.A.F. 1996).
Id.at 417 (quoting United States v. Sullivan, 42 M.J. 360, 363 (1995)).
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considered the "tenor and content of the email conversations" between the
defendant and the other AOL subscriber.67 The character of these
communications revealed that the correspondents had a reasonable
expectation that their conversations were private.6" It is noteworthy that the
court of appeals specifically stated that the possibility that "an
unauthorized 'hacker' might intercept an email message does not diminish
the legitimate expectation of privacy in any way. '69
Additionally, the court of appeals noted that AOL differed from other
systems in that its e-mail messages "are afforded more privacy than similar
messages on the Internet," because they are privately stored for retrieval on
the company's privately-owned computer bank, and are not read by or
disclosed to anyone - including AOL executives - other than the
authorized users."° It follows that AOL users not only have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in their e-mail messages, but also in those kept in
AOL's computers. It also follows that the police need obtain a warrant not
only to conduct real time surveillance of e-mail communications, but also
to search old files archived within the networks of service providers.
One analyst agrees with the court's ruling, maintaining that AOL, along
with similar services such as Prodigy and Compuserve, should be
classified as semi-public hosts that act as gateways to the Internet and
Internet e-mail, because they are relatively insulated from the worldwide
cyberspace."y This places AOL in a middle category between Local Area
Networks (LAN) that utilize internal lines and open systems that utilize
outside lines. In legal terms, there is a higher expectation of privacy in emails of such private on-line networks as AOL that afford their users
considerable privacy than in other e-mail accounts whose e-mails stream
across the open Internet. It goes without saying, however, that this
expectation hardly exists in e-mails transmitted over the exact same
network when directed to strangers (e.g., chat room participants or Usenet
newsgroup members), because the sender of such e-mail "runs the risk that
he is sending the message to an undercover agent," as one federal judge
simply put it in United States v. Charbonneau.y2
Bohach v. City of Renoy3 is another Fourth Amendment case involving
access to electronic messages stored on computers. But unlike Maxwell
that shed light on the nature of expectations of privacy in e-mail in the
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 418.
Maxwell, 45 M.J. at 417.
O'Brien, supra note 24, at 205, 206.
United States v. Charbonneau, 979 F. Supp. 1177, 1184 (S.D. Ohio 1997).
Bohach v. City of Reno, 932 F. Supp. 1232 (D. Nevada 1996).
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context of a private provider of electronic communications, Bohach
revolves around expectations of privacy in messages created and recorded
on a government-owned and government-operated computer system. The
computerized paging system (Alphapage), which was designed to free up
the regular telephone lines of the Reno Police Department, allowed the
user to compose and send brief alphanumeric or voice messages by
keyboard or telephone to the recipient officer's pager over a LAN system.
All the transmitted alphanumeric messages, which the federal court
described as "essentially electronic mail," were stored on the department's
routing computer.74 Bohach and Catalano, both members of the police
force, came under an internal affairs investigation because of the content
of the messages they sent to one another. They brought action to stop the
investigation and bar the disclosure of their electronic messages, claiming
that their storage on and retrieval from the department's computer network
was a violation of their constitutional right to privacy.
The district court agreed that the officers had a subjective expectation
of privacy simply because they would not have sent the sorts of messages
that triggered an investigation had they thought otherwise." However, it
concluded that it was not the kind of expectation that was objectively
reasonable based on a number of factors. First, there was no interception
or wiretapping of communications; the storage of sent information was part
of how the system worked.76 Second, the system was accessible to virtually
anyone with access to or working knowledge of it, and required no special
password or clearance to use it.77 Third, the primary purpose of the system

was to allow work-related and not private communications between police
personnel.7" Fourth, the fact that certain types of messages - such as
comments on the department's policies - were banned from the system
suggested that users should anticipate less privacy.7 9 Finally, the computer
service provider, that is the City of Reno, may access communications in
electronic storage as it pleased pursuant to the city ordinances.8 0
Despite the promise of the Maxwell precedent, the Bohach court found
that the affected parties had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the
communications they exchanged over a LAN computer system. There are
several key differences between the two cases that led to the different
conclusions. The first distinction between them is that the defendant in
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. at 1234.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1235.
Bohach, 932 F. Supp. at 1235.
Id.
Id. at 1236-37.
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Maxwell purchased all of his computer hardware, software, and Internet
service subscriptions with his personal funds, while the plaintiffs in
Bohach used the police department's terminal, computers, software, and
pagers. Another important distinction, which is a product of the first, is the
nature of the uses to which each system was intended. Whereas AOL had
no connection whatsoever with the officer's official duties and was
expressly not subject to monitoring, Alphapage was installed to facilitate
police work and allow for information flow between police personnel in a
timely fashion, and hence, implicitly subject to monitoring. In fact, the
Bohach court stated that it would have reached the same conclusions even
if an interception by the provider had actually occurred,"' which means that
Bohach and his fellow-officers were not entitled to harbor any privacy
expectations in messages transmitted over the department's computer
system.
Based on this ruling, one could argue that Maxwell should not have had
a legitimate expectation because his correspondent, who was a fellow
officer, could have forwarded his pornographic messages to the authorities.
To rebut this argument, we need to determine the point at which the Fourth
Amendment ceases to shield the electronic messages from government
access. In Bohach, Fourth Amendment protection did not exist in the first
place because of the real possibility, if not the implicit consent, that police
may monitor all communications between on-duty officers made over the
department's computer network. In Maxwell, by contrast, Fourth
Amendment protection remains in full effect until one party betrays the
confidence of the other. Only then is the constitutional protective guard
lifted because "the Fourth Amendment does not protect a wrongdoer's
misplaced belief that a person
to whom he voluntarily confides his
82
wrongdoing will not reveal it."

United States v. Monroe 3 posed more or less the same legal question
that Bohach answered, that is, whether a government officer has a
reasonable expectation of privacy in an e-mail account owned by the state
and is subject to monitoring. In Monroe, however, users gained access to
the system and the Internet through a personal log-on name and a private
password. Although e-mail was essentially reserved for official business
because all accounts resided on a computer owned by the U.S. Air Force,
on-base officers were allowed to use their e-mail to send and receive
personal messages from friends and family. Excessively large messages
that accumulated in the directory were automatically deleted after seventy-

81. Id. at 1237.
82. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966).
83. United States v. Monroe, 52 M.J. 326 (2000).
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two hours, but software errors sometimes prevented this automatic
deletion. As a result of an occasional system error, the two sergeants
charged with the network administration found fifty-nine messages that
had been stuck in the system for more than three days. Without opening
any of the lodged messages, they discerned that they could be pornographic
in nature from their sexually oriented names. Many of the suspected
messages were addressed to a user known as "monroer."' The sergeants'
suspicions were confirmed when they opened some of the messages and
discovered they contained sexually explicit photographs of women. This
user name was traced back to the e-mail account of the defendant, Robert
J. Monroe, which the administrators accessed to find out if he had
requested those images or was just the victim of a prank. In one of the
messages sent to the originator of the fifty-nine e-mails, they read a
reminder from Monroe to "send the file."' 5
A special investigation ensued, which culminated in the issuance of a
warrant authorizing the search of Monroe's dormitory room and the seizure
of all computer-related data media suspected to contain pornography. The
search produced a large number of graphic and textual computer files that
were obscene as legally defined, some of which contained child
pornography. Monroe unsuccessfully moved to suppress all evidence,
challenging the initial viewing of his stuck e-mails and the subsequent
invasion of his quarters as illegal searches, wanting in probable cause.
Affirming the decision of the Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals, the
Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces held that Monroe had no
reasonable expectation of privacy, not only in the e-mails that got lodged
in the network directory, but also in the ones stored in his personal e-mail
box. The Monroe court noted that this case differed from Maxwell in
several respects that warranted a different conclusion. First and foremost,
"AOL contractually agreed not to read or disclose subscribers' email to
anyone other than authorized users," whereas anyone logging into the Air
Force system received a specific banner message stating that "Users86
logging onto this system consent to monitoring by the HOSTADM.,
Second, the system here was owned by the government, which means that
no privacy interest could be asserted by consenting users, at least against
personnel officially responsible for maintaining the network." By the same

84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. at 328.
Id.
Id.at 330.
Id.
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token, the two sergeants in charge of system administration committed no
illegality when they tried to ascertain the nature of the messages clogging
the system.
Monroe confirms that government employees using government
computers have no expectation of privacy with regard to their e-mails and
any information stored on government-provided resources. The Fourth
Amendment then does not protect a government employee until law
enforcement authorities decide to extend the scope of the search beyond
the information seized from the central computer system or the personal
workstation. This means that the warrant requirements do not apply to
88
either the interception of communications or the access of stored files,
which makes the Monroe ruling the very opposite of Maxwell.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

As we have seen, relatively little case law exists to date that has
explored the concept of the Fourth Amendment right to privacy in the
context of e-mail. But while the foregoing cases may not have fully
addressed the matter, they provide us with adequate tools to develop a
constitutional standard for protecting the contents of e-mail messages. As
noted by the courts, similarities exist among various interpersonal and
interorganizational methods of communication, which could help adjust
the traditional legal boundaries to encompass the new e-mail technology
that has rapidly come into widespread use at home and at work.
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has not heard a e-mail search case
yet, commentators anticipate that the current interpretation of Katz would
carry over to e-mail communications. The Court has frequently taken the
position under Katz that the mere possibility of exposure to the public eye
diminishes and sometimes obviates one's privacy expectation. Based on
this premise, the Court may find that e-mail does not warrant Fourth
Amendment protection because, much like cordless telephone calls, people
perceive e-mails as susceptible to interception, not to mention the
increasing risk of stolen information in networked environments. Simply
stated, the Court may use the lack of security during the transmission of
messages and the dramatic rise in hacking and computer crime as reasons
to withhold Fourth Amendment protection altogether from e-mail
messaging.

88. LeEllen Coacher, PermittingSystems ProtectionMonitoring: When the Government Can

Look and What It Can See, 46 A.F. L. REv. 155, 169 (1999).
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Though consistent with the Court's holdings in the area of privacy, this
rationale bases the reasonableness of the users' privacy expectations almost
exclusively on the drawbacks in the existing technology or on the
limitations of the informational infrastructure. But even if we follow this
line of reasoning to its logical conclusion, e-mail should still be
constitutionally protected as long as privacy technology can be sufficiently
enhanced to eliminate or at least to reduce the security risks substantially. 9
One alternative, encryption technology, makes e-mail transmissions highly
secure because it scrambles the message contents until the message reaches
the intended recipient. Even if someone copies or captures an encrypted
message en route, only the holder of the encryption key may read the
message. Few, if any, would argue the unreasonableness of a privacy
expectation in this kind of Internet communication because strong
encryption makes e-mail practically impossible to decrypt and virtually
pointless to intercept.
Since encryption software has solved the security problem, then
encrypted e-mails should not have a lower standard of Fourth Amendment
protection than paper mail, even under the Court's narrow application of
the Katz test." Orin Kerr reasons that if by locking a container a person
creates a reasonable expectation of privacy in its contents, then an
encrypted message should receive the same Fourth Amendment protections
against the warrantless seizure or decryption by law enforcement
officials.9 ' If the concept of physical intrusion no longer controls Fourth
Amendment inquiry, it makes no sense to extend constitutional protection
to a locked container or a sealed package in transit,92 and then withhold the
protection from a locked electronic message in cyberspace traffic.
Further, in emergency conditions, or where probable cause exists, the
Court could treat e-mail searches as telephone wiretaps, thereby allowing
law enforcement agents to read all the messages on a suspect's account in
the same manner law enforcement can listen to every conversation passing
through the phone line. Courts may deem an overly broad search
acceptable, if not inevitable, for telephone communications because the
suspect destroys the evidence of criminality the moment the suspect hangs
up the phone, leaving no tangible trail of the verbal exchange for the police
to sift through.93 Police must intercept and record all incoming and
89. Chris J. Katopis, "Searching" Cyberspace: The FourthAmendment andElectronicMail,
14 TEMp. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 175, 204 (1995).
90. Id. at 520-21.
91. Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment in Cyberspace: Can Encryption Create a
"ReasonableExpectation of Privacy?," 33 CONN. L. REV. 504, 520-21 (2001).
92. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 114 (1984).
93. Bertron, supra note 53, at 175, 184, 188.
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outgoing calls to preserve such volatile evidence. This rationale, however,
does not hold in the case of e-mails where the evidence remains available
for search and seizure long after termination of the communication,
whether on the suspect's or the service provider's computer. Therefore, an
overly broad warrant authorizing the police to monitor all sent and received
e-mails repulses the Fourth Amendment as much as the general writs of
colonial America the Framers expressly sought to ban. A special software
program of the sort that AOL officials used in Maxwell to locate specific
messages could be used by government to automatically extract from
stored or intercepted messages the information that the police seek without
allowing excessive invasion of privacy or leaving too much to the
discretion of the officers executing the warrant.
The recent use ofpocketsize wireless pagers to receive e-mail messages
raises an interesting Fourth Amendment question as to whether
government may explore the contents of one's pager as part of a
warrantless search incident to an arrest. UnitedStates v. Reyes94 answered
this question in the affirmative. Federal agents seized a pager from Reyes
in the course of a lawful arrest, but searched its memory without obtaining
a warrant. The Reyes Court upheld the warrantless search of the pager
under Chimel v. California" as a search of a container incident to a valid
arrest. Megan Bertron contends that the warrant exception of Chimel is
inapplicable in this search situation because a pager, unlike a closed box,
cannot be used to hide a dangerous instrument or a deadly weapon.9 6
Moreover, if the pager poses no threat to the safety of the arresting officer,
then its search requires another warrant based on a separate determination
of probable cause.9 7
Also, the search of Reyes' pager did not protect against the concealing
or destroying of evidence because police had no reason to believe that the
pager contained information valuable to them in the first place.
Undertaking an immediate search in absence of knowledge that the pager
constituted destructible evidence makes the search a "blind fishing
expedition"" by which the arresting officers hoped to discover rather than
preserve incriminating evidence. In fact, previous rulings point out that
police should wait for the evaluation of a neutral magistrate rather than
conduct a prompt, warrantless search absent adequate justification because
"evidence may not be introduced if it was discovered by means of a seizure

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

United States v. Reyes, 922 F. Supp. 818 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
Bertron, supra note 53, at 179, 190.
Id. at 191.
Haywood v. United States, 268 F. 795, 803 (7th Cir. 1920).
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and search which were not reasonably related in scope to the justification
for their initiation."99 Therefore, unless the police have reason to believe
that a pager "contained evidence which would lose its value,"' 00 the police
should not search it incident to a lawful arrest.
Courts will also need to address the important question of whether
government may gain possession of private e-mails by a subpoena. The
police could serve a subpoena on the service provider to produce all emails sent or received by one or more subscribers stored in its computers,
or on the individual subscribers themselves, commanding them to produce
their own e-mails. Drawing on the courts' treatment of other means of
communication, nothing in the Fourth or Fifth Amendments prohibits
government from procuring e-mails by the first means. For instance, courts
could extend the rationale of Newfield v. Ryan,'' a telegraph case, and

draw this inference to e-mail. There the government served a telegraph
company with a subpoena requiring the production of "any and all
telegrams or copies thereof in [their] custody or control"'02 sent or received
within a limited period of time by certain clients pertaining to specific
transactions. The affected clients brought an action, attacking the subpoena
under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, and complaining that the
subpoena compelled them to testify against themselves. The circuit court
disagreed, holding that, because the circuit court served the subpoena on
the telegraph companies, the plaintiffs have "no standing whatever" to
invoke the Fifth Amendment because they "are being called upon neither
to produce evidence, nor to testify against themselves, they are not being
called upon at all."'0 3 Nor do the plaintiffs have standing to invoke the
Fourth Amendment because they are not "being subjected to a search and
seizure, reasonable or unreasonable, as to their persons, or their
properties.""' 4
If courts can subpoena telegrams, which bear the closest resemblance
to e-mails, then courts can subpoena e-mails too. The subpoena procedure
in practice requires less than the warrant procedure. Rather than the
probable cause requirement for warrants, to obtain material through a
subpoena the government need only present a court with "specific and
articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds" to demonstrate

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 29 (1968).
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 4 (1977).
Newfield v. Ryan, 91 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1937).
Id. at 701.
Id. at 705.
Id.
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that the communications sought relate to an ongoing criminal
investigation. 0 5
UnitedStates v. Barr °6 also substantiates this position. In this case, the
district court served a subpoena on a private company (Affiliated) that
Barr, a suspect for engaging in narcotics-related activities, employed to
receive his mail and telephone messages. The district court served a
subpoena on Affiliated requesting the production of mail addressed to
"Larry Freeman," an alleged alias for the defendant.0 7 The district court
rejected Barr's claim that the subpoena violated his right against selfincrimination and that it used the subpoena to circumvent the warrant
requirements since "the agents who served the subpoena did not coerce
compliance by force or threats or overstep their legal authority" and "the
subpoena was not overly broad."'0 8 Moreover, the burdens imposed on a
suspect by the subpoena process likely do not offend the Fourth or Fifth
Amendment unless a subpoena lacks specificity, or "when government
agents improperly impinge on the defendant's right to contest the
subpoena's validity or a court's authority to quash, alter or enforce it."1'09
Again, these rules equally apply to a subpoena compelling the production
of e-mails from a third party.
Courts could reach a different conclusion, however, regarding the
procurement of e-mails from the subscribers themselves by subpoena. Email distinguishes itself from postal mail and other forms of
communication in that the drafter may (optionally) keep a copy of every
sent message on the hard drive of the computer. This carbon copy, kept for
personal reference, contains private communications whose introduction
at trial could turn the sender into an involuntary witness against himself
and therefore give rise to constitutional concerns, since a court serves the
subpoena on him and the words sought are his. A different situation exists
when obtaining the same message from the receiver or the service provider
because of the personal nature of the Fifth Amendment which only the
holder may assert to bar the production of documentary evidence." 0

105. Michael S. Leib, Email and the Wiretap Laws: Why Congress Should Add Electronic
Communication to Title III's Statutory Exclusionary Rule and Expressly Reject a "GoodFaith"
Exception, 34 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 393, 406 (1997).
106. United States v. Barr, 605 F. Supp. 114 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).

107. Id. at 116.
108. Id. at 119.
109. Id. at 118.
110. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 397 (1976) (stating that "[t]he Court has held
repeatedly that the Fifth Amendment is limited to prohibiting the use of 'physical or moral
compulsion' exerted on the person asserting the privilege").
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UnitedStates v. Hubbell,I' I supports the above conclusion. There the
U.S. Supreme Court held that a broadly-worded subpoena calling for the
production of diaries and personal electronic mail messages, among other
personal records, violated the Fifth Amendment. Precisely stated, a
subpoena runs afoul of the Fifth Amendment if government lacks "any
prior knowledge of either the existence or the whereabouts" of the
subpoenaed evidence.1"2 The act of producing such confidential documents,
that have a questionable existence, has a testimonial aspect in itself
because it implicates the self-incrimination clause forcing the defendant to
acknowledge the "existence, possession, and authenticity" of the sought
documents." 3 Therefore arguing under Hubbell, the government may not
serve an e-mail user with a subpoena compelling the production of stored
e-mail messages since not all e-mail users always keep a copy of their sent
e-mails on their personal machines.
Moreover, the testimonial and communicative nature of e-mail affords
it further protection from government access. To define the ambit of the
privilege against self-incrimination, the Hubbell Court clarified what
constitutes a compelled testimony by noting two important points
applicable to e-mail. First, it noted that "[t]he word 'witness' in the
constitutional text limits the relevant category of compelled incriminating
communications to those that are 'testimonial' in character,""... 4 and second,
that "there is a significant difference between the use of compulsion to
extort communications from a defendant and compelling a person to
engage in conduct that may be incriminating."' " Because e-mail stored on
a person's hard drive has both testimonial and communicative
characteristics, then its introduction at trial over the objection of its owner
raises both Fourth and Fifth Amendment concerns despite the fact the
writer expressly uses it to convey information to another party. This
constitutes the quintessential evidence that the Fifth Amendment protects
a person from furnishing against himself. The Court may well accept this
from its broad statement that the "'right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and

111. United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27 (2000).
112. Id. at 45.
113. Id. at43-44.
114. Id. at 34.
115. 1d. (referring to a subtle distinction initially made by Justice Holmes in Holt v. United
States, 218 U.S. 245, 252, 253 (1910)). Examples of compulsion to engage in conduct that may
incriminate include forcing a subject to give a blood sample, to blow in a breath analyzer, to put
on a piece of apparel found at the crime scene, or to report to the police station for a suspect lineup.
Though coercive, these government actions do not violate the Fifth Amendment because they
involve no extraction of communication of any kind.

20031

ELECTRONIC MAIL SURVEILLANCE AND THE REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY

159

seizures,' would not be violated, under any ordinary construction of
language, by compelling obedience to a subpoena.""' 6 This argument
obviously does not equally apply to personal e-mails of public employees
stored on government-owned computers who must restrict their use to
work-related purposes.
One final question remains: should the courts allow the government to
engage in real time monitoring of all e-mail correspondence over its
systems, or to freely access any employee e-mail account on the networks
that it owns? Courts should not answer the question whether courts should
give the government blanket authority to conduct general searches of its
employee accounts, but rather, whether the government may deprive public
servants of all privacy interests in their e-mail." 7 This forces courts to
make a public policy decision as much as a constitutional law decision.
Judges clearly involve themselves in policymaking through the
establishment of authoritative rules and in determining the scope of their
application. Besides, their decisions directly influence how
government
18
agents will act and use their official authority and power.'
I believe probable cause and the full search warrant requirements
should preserve only the rights of private citizens using semi-public
carriers such as AOL, which contractually ensure the privacy of their users
as already decided in Maxwell, as well as to those using privately-owned
Internet services that utilize encryption technology. As for governmental
work settings, I propose that the judiciary ought to create different
classifications of public organizations entitling employees to different
levels of Fourth Amendment protection in their use of electronic
communications based on their organization's nature or the sensitivity of
its operations. Employees of the FBI, CIA, armed forces, and various law
enforcement agencies, for instance, would have minimized privacy rights
because of the crucial importance of their organizations to national security
and public safety. This category of government organization would equate
in the informational sense with the extra hazardous and pervasively

116. Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 607 (1913).
117. Since the Court said in Monroe that expectations of privacy did not hold because of the
posting of a warning about monitoring as well as posting ofgovernment ownership ofthe machines,
then the Court rejected privacy as a matter of constitutional law. But the fact that the action does
not implicate Fourth and Fifth Amendments does not mean that the government acted beneficently
as a matter of public policy. Complete absence of privacy in any work setting arguably runs counter
to public policy because it may undermine collegiality and the spirit of community in the work
place. By adopting a flexible sliding scale rather than a rigid bright line approach to e-mail searches,
the Court could serve the needs of law enforcement while promoting a healthy organizational
culture. United States v. Monroe, 52 M.J. 326 (2000).
118. CHRISTOPHER SMrrH, COURTS AND PuBuc PoucY 3 (1993).
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regulated industries subject to warrantless periodic inspections to ensure
strict compliance with health and safety standards. The surveillance of
computer information systems and e-mail accounts of employees working
under special demands of discipline and duty analogize to authorized
inspections, which permit limited intrusions for defined purposes when a
special need exists." 9 This proposal equates with the courts' rulings in
Bohach and Monroe.
Courts could create another classification for e-mail communications
between employees working for public organizations not charged with
intelligence or order-maintenance functions, which would subject them to
the lower constitutional standard of reasonable suspicion as a balance
between the more rigorous probable cause standard and the absence of all
protection."0 Under this scheme, government would have to have a
reasonable suspicion in order to access the e-mail accounts of these
employees, or at least present to a court an after-the-fact showing of
reasonable suspicion as a precondition to admitting any e-mails into
evidence. Agencies could conduct a full-fledged search later if the situation
unfolds and probable cause is found. This actually happened in Monroe,
where the reasonable suspicion of the sergeants gave rise to probable
cause, which, in turn, prompted a legal search. But the Monroe Court
declined to dwell on these technical limitations because authorities could
have still performed an initial full-fledged search of all the defendant's emails absent any suspicion of wrongdoing. This sliding-scale approach has
the double advantage of deterring the improper use of e-mail on the part of
public employees and preventing needlessly invasive behavior on the part
of the state. The adoption of this alternative standard entails a case-by-case
analysis because in the absence of a bright line rule, "the evaluation must
be made from the facts of each particular case."121
In light of the vital role the Internet and e-mail have come to play in our
society, a reinterpretation of the Fourth Amendment and perhaps a whole
new subfield of search law will develop. The keys to this new legal world
ultimately lie in the hands of the U.S. Supreme Court, which must strike
the balance between promoting technology and protecting society from the
same. In developing this new body of law, however, the courts must

119. Coacher, supra note 87, at 168.
120. There is no point in denying public university employees, for instance, privacy in their
e-mails (and potentially restricting their academic freedom) because the state has not entrusted them
with such functions that call for close scrutiny, such as protecting public life, health, or safety. This
is my original analysis and personal opinion.
121. United States v. Barr, 605 F. Supp. 114, 117 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
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remember that liberty, as a core value, has brought this country thus far and
continues to propel it forward.
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